

First CSR and Sustainability E- Newsletter in Bangladesh
Vol. 1, No. 5, June 2009
(For private circulation only)



Message from the Executive Director

I am happy to share with you the fifth issue of CSR E-Newsletter.

CSR-Corporate Social Responsibility Bangladesh is a social enterprise started with a vision to provide SR related services to public and private sector in Bangladesh. The objective of the newsletter is to provide corporate information and news specially focused on sustainability and development related issues. It aims to provide information to the stakeholders regarding social accountability and responsibility.

The sustainable development cannot be achieved without being socially responsible and having adequate understanding and knowledge about social aspect of business.

Upcoming CSR Bangladesh Publications

Expected date of Publication November, 2009

Socially Responsible Booklet

1. Children's Edition
2. Teenager's Edition
3. Professional's Edition
4. Businessmen's Edition

Call for Contributors

CSR Case Book

We seek business case studies from different sectors in Bangladesh for upcoming CSR Case book publications. We welcome industry cooperation in this regard. Any individual or organizations interested to contribute are highly requested to contact the editor.

Please send your case studies to the following e-mail address by July 15:

editor@csrbangladesh.org

CSR Essentials Training

Program: Comprehensive Training
Target Group: Stakeholders, managers and interested person
Date: July 18, 2009
Time: 6:00 pm– 9:00 pm
Venue: Hotel Washington
Gulshan I
Dhaka 1212
Registration: Open [Limited Seats]

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- Introducing CSR Dhaka Forum
- Introducing CSR Master Class soon.....

CHILD LABOUR DILEMMA OF BANGLADESH GARMENT INDUSTRY (a case)



By Edward Probir Mondol

With other team members at CMD, IUBAT

(SUSTAINABILITY COMMODITY CHAINS of the Asia Link Programme)

Revised 2 February 2006

A JOLT

In 1995, the ready made garment industry (RMG) sector in Bangladesh received a jolt from consumer rejection and threat of product boycott in USA, its major export market, on the issue of products made by child labour. Apart from the growing consumer rejection of Bangladeshi garments, different organisations, Child Labour Coalition (CLC) in particular warned the industry of a formal product boycott as of May 1995 unless the child labour related issues are resolved. This sent shock waves throughout the garment industry in Bangladesh. Their very survival was at stake. After seeing a long spell of boom, it suddenly faced the possibility of losing its major buyer, the USA. RMG is a relatively young sector, established in 1977 and developed rapidly after 1983. In 1993, Bangladesh exported nearly \$750 million in apparel to the United States which was more than 50% of the total garments export at that point in time.

Earlier, American television newsmagazine "NBC Dateline" ran a documentary showing America's largest retailer, Wal-Mart, selling clothing labelled "Made in USA" that was actually produced in Bangladesh with child labour. This put pressure on Wal-Mart to cancel its contracts with Bangladeshi manufacturers. Other companies informed their Bangladesh partners that the use of child labour was creating negative press and was bad for business.

The individual garment factories, their industrial association - Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), the Government of Bangladesh (GoB), the investing bankers, other stakeholders and civil society became alarmed. The situation was further aggravated by the watchdog role of international organisations and agencies. Panic action varied from denial to firing of child labour in the face of threat of losing export orders, which further accentuated the peril of children who lost all means of livelihood. Such panic action brought in further condemnation with threat of more organised consumer boycott of Bangladeshi garments forcing buyers to start looking for alternative product sources. The stakeholders within Bangladesh and abroad were forced to realise the complex nature of child labour and the dilemma faced by the industry and human rights organisations in working out a solution which will be both pro-trade and pro-child welfare.

The Harkin Bill did not appear overnight. It was in fact the latest draft version of a legislative bill that was first introduced by other congressional authors, working its way through the houses of US Congress for five years. Its purpose was to close a long recognized loophole in child labour provisions of the Fair Labour Standards Act (FLSA) 1938. The FLSA prohibits the sale of domestic products made with child labour to control child labour in domestic manufacturing. But, the FLSA does not cover imported products, allowing products made by child labour in other countries to be traded without restriction. Between 1987 and 1992, four bills were submitted calling for the removal of under-aged children from bad working conditions and allowing them to attend school. However, these bills were never approved despite generating a lot of attention. In 1992, Senator Harkin submitted a revised version of the bill known as 'Child Labour Deterrence Act' or Harkin Bill, calling for ban on US purchases of all goods produced by children under 15 years of age. The Harkin Bill threatened US-Government trade sanctions on any industry producing goods with child labour.



The Harkin Bill received wide media publicity creating consumer and trade sensitivities. Citizen outcry over child labour in Bangladesh's export garment industry touched crescendo to a fevered pitch. In March of 1993, Senator Harkin reintroduced his bill and framed it as "about eliminating a major form of child abuse in our world...This legislation is not about imposing our standards on the developing world. It's about preventing those manufacturers in the developing world who exploit child labour from imposing their standards on the United States....countries do not have to wait until poverty is eradicated or they are fully developed before eliminating the economic exploitation of children.

Harkin was well aware of the controversy his initial bill had already ignited in Bangladesh. The print media warned as early as December 1992 that were the Harkin Bill to become law and Bangladeshi garment exports to be sanctioned by the United States, "cautious estimates say some 40,000 to 50,000 low age workers would be driven out of the garment industry...fuelling serious social problems in urban areas." Harkin viewed these moves as a cynical attempt by industry to rid itself of a problem while blaming outsiders for imposing their standards on Bangladesh. He tried to turn the tables rhetorically by asserting that the bill reintroduced in 1993 was "not about imposing our standards."

DENIAL, HIDING AND RETRENCHING

As soon as information of the Harkin Bill circulated in summer 1992, the very first, almost reflex reaction by the garment factories was to totally deny the presence of any child worker in their factories. But, the reality was too big to be denied. Some factories, out of sheer fear, started firing the children while others tried to hide them in various manners. For example, in its written testimony to the U.S. Department of Labour's International Child Labour Hearing, the Embassy of Bangladesh made representation that operations are simple and technology is uncomplicated in the garment industry. Most of the work is performed by women. These women, in the absence of any guardian at home, bring along their children, particularly female ones, for security and day-care, to their places of work.

However, investigations and reporting by other organisations revealed a contradictory scenario. U.S. Departments of Labour and State officials, AAFLI representatives, and other NGO's, however, have witnessed children on their way to work in the morning, without parents, carrying their Tiffin and holding their time-cards. AAFLI's study found that very few children interviewed had an immediate family member (father, mother, brother, or sister) working in the same factory, but most had a friend or some distant relative who arranged for them to get the job.

Most employers, fearing to loose their position on the market, began to release children from garment factories with no provisions for their rehabilitation. Most found new jobs often more dangerous and with worse working conditions, notably in the informal sector. Some reports indicated that children removed from the garment factories were forced to resort to more dangerous and lesser paid work in the informal sector. Rumours circulated that many of the children ended up as street beggars, domestic servants, or were forced into prostitution. Other reports noted that the children were hired by underground subcontractors, working in hidden garment sweatshops under worse conditions than before. While there is no clear evidence

describing what happened to the children, it is clear that the GoB was not providing adequate schools or other programs for them.

Such a girl child was Chameli, who had been fired outright from a garments factory and was compelled to start working as a domestic servant. In her words, 'The buyers came and forced me to leave the job at the garments factory. I had nothing else to do. So, my mother told me to start working as a maid servant. I didn't want to do that. But, we had nothing to eat. So, my mother beat me until I agreed. My mother said education will do me no good and if I don't work we wouldn't survive.'

The situation gave rise to pressure from the local NGO community questioning the outright dismissal of children and arguing that the task could be classified as 'light work' under the terms of ILO Convention 138. Once it became apparent that there was no safety net for the dismissed children, representatives of the ILO, United Nations Children Educational Fund (UNICEF), the Asian-American Free Labour Institute (AAFLI) and officials of the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka, asked the BGMEA to cease firing underage workers until a school system and other measures were in place.

BLOCKING

By August 1993, Bangladeshi trade unions and NGOs had ramped up their criticism of the Harkin Bill calling for a counter-campaign. A wide range of commentators in Bangladesh and beyond denounced the Harkin Bill and warned of its potentially damaging effects. Articles in the press ranged from relatively moderate critiques that the naïve effort was out of context with local development realities to spiteful attacks accusing the Harkin Bill as part of a larger, neo-colonial plot to keep Bangladesh underdeveloped and weak. Among the fiercest responses was that of commentator Farhad Mazhar, a vehement critic, who argued the Harkin Bill was simply an "attempt to maintain business interests with the excuse of 'human rights'...the imperialist process has put on the garb of 'human rights.'"

Activists organized press conference and called upon all quarters to wage a movement against the Harkin Bill and protect the children's rights. They also called for enacting a law regarding utilization of child labour'. Farida Akter, a principal organizer of the counter-campaign, argued: "No child works 10 to 12 hours a day for a paltry wage for the fun of it. The need for survival forces them to take up jobs in factories instead of going to school...To throw these kids onto the streets would be a serious violation of their human rights." Since the Harkin Bill related only to child labour in export-oriented industries, Akter and others viewed it as "protectionism in the guise of children's rights." Hameeda Hossain of the human rights group Ain-o-Salish Kendra (NGO) argued: 'we were opposed to the Bill for two reasons. First it did not take into account the reality that termination of children would not resolve the problem of poverty, nor end child labour, it would merely transfer child labour to other forms, and perhaps worse forms of work. Also we did not think trade controls are a democratic way of changing policy environments.'

On the milder side, one national daily 'The Daily Star' editorialized: "...the gauge [the USA] applies for maintaining the standard often proves greater than our society, in the absence of so many supporting conditions and factors, can agreeably respond to." Anticipating the argument



of US organisations that children should be in school, not at work, the paper continued: “Child workers earn...at least to feed themselves or to supplement their parents’ income; and in worst cases, to solely support their families. If they could not get employment in the garments factory, chances were that either they had to put their labour into more hazardous or harder jobs or simply had to sit idle. But the prospect of their going to school surely would have been nil. So laws do not speak to the whole story.” A supporting argument typically was of the nature that: “It’s like forcing the poorer countries, where minimum social safety net is absent, to swallow the Western standard of human rights”. Nur Khan Liton, an activist with Ain-O-Salish Kendra (NGO), writing for the weekly Dhaka Courier in September 1993, argued that Senator Harkin had misinterpreted the legal standards he invoked as justifying a complete ban on child labour. Light work by children, he argued, was not only permitted under ILO Convention 138 but in some cases, was absolutely necessary. Though acknowledging that child labour is not intrinsically desirable, Liton argued that eliminating it without providing for remediation and education program would not be the best interest of poor children: “The right to food is no less important than the right to liberty. Freedom from hunger is no less important than civil and political freedom...We have to recognize the reality of our situation before we can devise effective ways to change.”

The ‘counter campaign’ is a clear example of outright blocking of the American-led Harkin Bill campaign. Bangladeshi activists not only blocked the definition of human rights central to the campaign, they also proposed alternative definition of human rights and corresponding action. Notably, opposition to the Harkin Bill within Bangladesh was not wholly uniform and blocking actions were far from monolithic in nature and degree. As indicated from the range of commentary in the local press, there were subtle (and not so subtle) distinctions among the perspectives of actors involved in the “blocking” process.

Most alarming point made by activists and reiterated by representatives of international organizations such as the ILO and UNICEF was that children dismissed from work in the garment industry had gone into prostitution. Rijk Van Haarlem, who directed child labour prevention efforts for the ILO in Bangladesh at that time, explained that the initial version of the Harkin Bill made 'no provisions for rehabilitation of the children. Many were faced with destitution. It is assumed that thousands of them sought and found other, often more dangerous jobs. Some ended up in prostitution.' Actual data on the number of children working as prostitutes, as a direct result of the Harkin Bill is scarce. Yet this claim took on the air of truth and was pointed by the press, policymakers, business, and NGOs – as well as representatives of UN organizations and European NGOs. Activists from Bangladesh and developing countries defended their interpretation of child rights – one that included the right to work, lest children suffer worse consequences (i.e., prostitution) – by pointing to evidence of grievous bodily and moral harm to children dismissed from the garment factories. They opposed the Harkin Bill campaign by asserting the primacy of physical integrity as a non-violable right. In this case, the innovation was to tie protection of that right directly to analysis of the economic rights (and vulnerability) of child workers.

US and developed country activists, however, opposed such linkage. They asserted that there was little proof of the link between the Harkin Bill and child prostitution. If children went into prostitution at all, it was not Senator Harkin who was to blame, they argued, but Bangladeshi

employers who had failed the children from the outset. Appropriate or not, the claim that fired child workers were going into prostitution had the effect of pushing economic rights issues to the forefront of negotiations among business, the GoB and United States government, UN organizations, and NGOs.

SHIFTING POSITION

In the later part of 1994, the complexities of child labour issue in the RMG sector of Bangladesh emerged clearly and the aspect of outright dismissal of child labour to avoid market denial in the USA became controversial. NGOs working in the sector both at national and international levels started realising the dire situation of displaced child garment workers and moved away from monolithic dismissal as the only approach to solution of the problem. The leading US organisation namely Child Labour Coalition (CLC) acceded to Bangladesh and other developing country demands to include economic rights explicitly in the bargaining framework. The CLC urged that central to any agreement negotiated among the parties concerned with child labour, there should be both a redemption programme and a factory monitoring programme. The CLC had to make explicit its support for economic rights. Resisting the Harkin Bill pushed the American activists to broaden the way they framed child rights – to include economic rights issues explicitly. At the time the Harkin Bill was reintroduced in 1993, Pharis Harvey (Co-Chair of the CLC) challenged: "...It will be of no use to bar the products of child labour if the US is at the same time fostering it indirectly through policies that encourage cheap-wage exports without labour standards protection or that put the burden of debt relief on the backs of the poorest people in developing countries." Harvey's statement signalled an open acknowledgement of economic rights on the part of American NGOs at the helm of the campaign. But the CLC's decision to launch a consumer boycott anyway was one of the most controversial and critical aspects of its anti-child labour campaign. Representatives of the CLC and their supporters have steadfastly argued that they made this move as a last resort.

From 1992 when the child labour issue first hit the headlines till 1995, Bangladeshi garment manufacturers had balked not only at agreeing to educate or otherwise rehabilitate displaced child workers but also at allowing transparent monitoring of their factories. The BGMEA essentially stalled the progress of negotiations for over a year (1994-95), despite the CLC's hope that a draft agreement under negotiation would be signed during a visit by then-First Lady Hillary Clinton to Bangladesh, scheduled for March 31, 1995. By Spring 1995, it appeared that the BGMEA was no closer to signing the agreement than it had been a year earlier. The number of children who had by now been fired from factories without provisions for their well-being had swelled into the tens of thousands. On April 19, 1995 representatives of the CLC warned BGMEA that a boycott would officially begin within one month, on May 20, 1995. Following the BGMEA's rejection of the proposed agreement, the CLC solicited approval from its membership for a boycott. The change in tactics on the part of the CLC is significant: as long as the Harkin Bill appeared stalled in Congress (i.e., unlikely to become law) and negotiations over the agreement dragged on, members of the BGMEA and the GoB could afford to deny the accusations of the campaign and could resist taking concrete action. When it appeared that consumers would move an industry boycott forward regardless of whether the Harkin Bill became law or not, the industry had to sit up and take notice.



By May 26th, 1995, the Bangladeshi press reported that BGMEA would launch a counter-offensive against the CLC. Pharis Harvey of the CLC wrote to the BGMEA president, urging negotiations on the agreement and offering to “suspend the next phase of the campaign...we will not suspend the boycott itself but we will postpone for one week from today the next, mass phase of our work.” The CLC also offered to “communicate our position to importers and retailers in this country (i.e., the United States), and to ask for their cooperation with a plan for humane, phased elimination of child labour in Bangladesh.” Harvey insisted that “success for the industry must not be on the basis of the exploitation of children.” The CLC took the additional step on June 2nd of writing to 30 major American manufacturers, reporting that a MoU between business, Government and key UN agencies was “being drafted for approval at a meeting on Saturday, June 3” and requesting companies to “respond to this situation – both to support this model program, as well as to help end the US consumer boycott of Bangladesh garments.”

THE FIRST MoU

Negotiations in Dhaka gained pace thereafter – with the US and Bangladeshi governments now centrally involved, and BGMEA moving toward a compromise on the language, funding, and monitoring provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). By June 29th the CLC’s national co-ordinator wrote to membership with an “urgent action” request to halt the boycott on July 5th and to send letters endorsing the MoU to American Embassy staff in Dhaka, to be read at the signing (planned for July 4th). The US Department of Labour followed the negotiations closely, and rallied other international donors to support schooling and stipend programs for the fired child workers. The Department of Labour also marshalled support for the agreement in the US Congress. Senior Department of Labour official Andrew Samet requested that Senator Harkin be prepared to formally endorse the agreement which it lauded as “a very important precedent that...helps Bangladesh enforce its existing national laws on factory labour under age 14. No new definitions of age are being introduced from abroad...UNICEF is also mounting larger programs for many other Bangladeshi children who are in the informal sector and are not covered by this MoU.”

Samet’s comments seem aimed at rebutting criticism (by Bangladeshis on the resisting end and their supporters in European NGOs and elsewhere) that the agreement was an outside imposition of foreign values, and that it ignored child labour outside the export industry. By insisting that the age standards were not a foreign imposition, Samet sought to persuade critics that the solution to the child labour problem drew on local understandings of children’s role in society – and that these Bangladeshi labour laws and work standards themselves stipulated no factory work should be done by people under the age of 14. His efforts to ensure normative buying on the part of opponents to the agreement signal a shift on the part of the US Government that parallels the CLC’s own shift toward a more public embrace of economic rights issues.

Under the terms of the 3-year MoU signed on July 4, 1995, the BGMEA pledged \$900,000 for stipends/schooling over three years. UNICEF pledged \$175,000 for alternative schools in the first year, with additional funds thereafter. ILO pledged \$250,000 for a survey of displaced children, as well as for monitoring and stipends in the first year, with additional funds thereafter. Stipends for children were set at 300 Taka/month – roughly one third of what many child workers would earn in a month.

Aware that this might not go far enough to replace income lost by working children taken out of the factories, the developers of the agreement envisioned giving children's work to family members and setting up family credit programs later. But for children faced with the immediate loss of a significant source of income and only the promise of income replacement programs down the line, the option of schooling would become less attractive over time. Under this MoU, all children younger than 14 found in clothing factories in Dhaka and Chittagong districts, where virtually all of BGMEA's members are concentrated, were to be put into schools. The MoU provided for monitoring teams to conduct surprise visits to BGMEA member factories to verify whether they have workers younger than 14. A monitoring team was comprised of two ILO representatives and one representative each from the GoB and BGMEA. Following the July 4th, 1995 signing of the MoU, the CLC officially called off its boycott the next day. Resisting the Harkin Bill had an impact on changing the way American activists articulated children's rights and how policymakers and business developed programs in response to the needs of working children.

AFTERMATH

When children were discovered in a BGMEA member factory they were offered the chance to enrol in schools run by two Bangladeshi NGOs, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Gono Shahajja Shangstha (GSS), under the supervision of UNICEF. They were offered informal instruction for three hours a day plus financial assistance (a stipend) of 300 takas a month intended to partly compensate the family's loss of income. These 300 takas were funded by the ILO, UNICEF and the BGMEA. Children who qualified can be enrolled in public schools. After 14, all those who had finished the informal courses had an opportunity to take vocational training (in electronic assembly, handicrafts, autos, sewing and so forth), but they no longer received financial assistance. Some went back to working in a factory half-time and take a training course the rest of the time. The two partner NGOs of UNICEF then helped them land with a job, and they claim that 80% found one quickly. Another plus is that the children who took the informal education offered by the two NGOs often received better marks than those who attended only public schools. It is worth noting, however, that each former child worker who got the chance to go to school for a certain period of time required a great deal of persuasive talent on the part of the ILO, BRAC and GSS staff to persuade their families.

Till October 1996, a total of 1,922 inspections were carried out. 310 factories (16%) were found temporarily closed, while 958 (50%) were found to be child free. In the remaining 654 (34%) factories 5,674 child workers were identified. On 31 October 1996, the BGMEA declared that the garment industry was free of child labour. But, the identified children were not yet enrolled in schools. Beside, not all the factories were inspected at that time. Results of this monitoring drive were however according to the ILO, seen as a major step in the right direction.

After 31st October 1996, factory monitoring continued. Factories that were suspected of using child labour are monitored more frequently. In February 1997 the number of factories found with child labour started to rise again. Until then, the BGMEA did not fine any of the employers who were found employing child labour. The BGMEA was pressurised by the ILO, UNICEF and the US Embassy to deal with the violations. Therefore an arbitration committee was established to summon the employers who were found 'guilty'. The committee started its work in June 1997.



In July 1997, 2,445 inspections were carried out, in which 1,426 children were identified in 309 factories. The factories that were temporarily closed amounted 159, while 1,963 factories were child labour free. Compared to the compiled data of the 1995 survey and the 1996 monitoring drive, a decrease in child labour can be noted.

According to the reports by the monitoring teams, the percentage of factories visited where children younger than 14 are found fell from 43% in 1995 to 34% in 1996, 11% in 1997 and 5% in August 2000. According to ILO data, the percentage of workers under 14 as a share of the total labour force working in this sector was therefore 0.05% in 2000. Despite a certain amount of criticism from some quarters about the full reliability of these figures, there is general agreement that the number of children working in RMG factories in Bangladesh that export clothing has therefore fallen sharply since the MoU went into effect.

But as a Case Study has revealed, on the premises of one textile union, two girls aged 13 and 15 told that when foreign visitors or monitoring teams arrive at the factory where they work, all the children younger than 14 have to hide in the toilets, kitchens, on the roof, and so forth. They did not know how the employer could know about the visits. Some sources in the unions cited the possibility that the guard stationed at the entrance to each factory has the time to phone the shop foreman to alert him to the arrival of visitors.

That being said, this problem should not be overstated to the point of concluding that the checks were ineffective. The chances of seeing an employer use children are reduced by the fact that to be able to hide them quickly they would have to be few in number, which would therefore mean a great deal of effort and risk for a meagre profit.

The signing of the MoU agreement was the first of its type in the world. The ILO, pleased with the results it yielded, had used it as a model for agreements signed in Pakistan (the football industry in Sialkot) and Latin America. That being said, however, notwithstanding the success achieved in Dhaka and Chittagong, it would be wrong to think that a panacea has been found here against child labour in the world.

Acknowledgement:

- Elimination of Child Labour from Export Garment Industry of Bangladesh – An Experience of Western Intervention: Runa Begum, September 2003
 - By The Sweat and Toil of Children - A Report to Congress, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor, July 15, 1994
 - Child Labor in the Garment Industry of Bangladesh - TED Case Studies, Number 673, 2003
- Bridging the Divide: Transnational Advocacy on Labor and Economic Rights - Lessons from the Field, Shareen Hertel, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 2003 (Please Do Not Cite Without The Author's Permission Email: sh451@columbia.edu)

CSR Bangladesh News Desk**CSR Weekly Bulletin**

CSR Bangladesh is publishing CSR Weekly Bulletin from the month of September 2009

CSR Bangladesh Newsletter Name

CSR Bangladesh Newsletter has got its own name as “Sustainability Watch” starting from the Month of June 2009.

Processing MoU with Global Gandhian Trusteeship and CSR Foundation, India.

CSR Bangladesh is processing toward MoU with CSR Foundation in India for joint research and training in CSR.

International Research Fellowship Award

Mr. Edward Probir Mondol, Executive Director of CSR Bangladesh has received International Research Fellowship award to conduct a study on CSR in South Asia. The study is the joint publication of “CSR Handbook: A South Asian Context” by International Management Institute, New Delhi, India.

Interview with Pradeep Kashyap CEO, MART, India

Mr Edward Probir Mondol, Editor of CSR Bangladesh took an interview of Mr Pradeep Kashyap, CEO, MART, India. The interview will be published in June Edition.

CSR Bangladesh Newsletter in Bangla Edition from the month of January 2010

CSR Bangladesh will publish Bangla Edition of CSR Newsletter from month of January 2010.

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CSR

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Corporate Social Responsibility of Bangladesh - CSR Bangladesh is being launched with a vision to facilitate, expand and encourage CSR practice in Bangladesh. The CSR Bangladesh's objectives are to become the source of information, resources and advisory services on SR in Bangladesh.

Scope of CSRB

- Raise CSR Awareness among stakeholders
- Provide Strategic, structured and systematic tools for CSR practice and adoption
- Evaluate, implement and monitor CSR for profit maximization
- Good Governance Advisory Services
- Establish benchmark for CSR practices

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
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About CSR Bangladesh

What is CSRB?

Corporate Social Responsibility of Bangladesh – CSR Bangladesh is being launched with private sector start up to facilitate, expand and encourage CSR practice in Bangladesh. Registered as a firm in 2008.

What does it do?

The CSR Bangladesh objective is to become the source of information, resources and advisory services on CSR in Bangladesh.

Scope/Area of CSRB

Raise CSR Awareness amongst CSR stakeholders

Provide Strategic, structured and systematic tools for CSR practice and adoption

Evaluate, implement and monitor CSR for profit maximization

Good Governance

Establish benchmark for CSR practices

VISION

Our vision is to create awareness regarding CSR for the organisation with its primary stakeholders and extended enterprise the benefits of social compliance and sustainability.

MISSION

To be a partner for sustainable growth and development.